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INTRODUCTION1
Deliberative theory stems from a central as-
sumption about understanding politics in de-
liberative terms: individuals’ preferences 
have an endogenous nature, which means 
1 This article was made possible by the funding re-
ceived from the Agencia Andaluza del Agua (Anda-
lusian Water Agency) and the Proyecto Intramural 
they are liable to change and are not exclusi-
vely determined by material reasons outside 
of the individual (Besette, 1980). This princi-
ple gives rise to the argumentational nature 
of decisions adopted deliberatively, that is, in 
a non-coercive environment decisions are 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the way participants change their mind in a deliberative 
forum. Its contribution lies in studying the extent to which these changes 
persist over time. We start from Mackie’s assumption that changes of opinion 
in a deliberative context cannot be interpreted by considering isolated varia-
bles, but must be based on individual attitudinal networks in which preferen-
ces are embedded. The results show that certain changes after deliberation 
are not maintained by some individuals. The paper details the importance 
of certain variables in the change of opinion in the short and long term, as 
well as the relationship that exists between different attitudes (information, 
preferences, beliefs and political effi cacy) at three different times before 
and after deliberation.
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Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el cambio de opinión de los participantes 
en un foro deliberativo. Su contribución reside en estudiar hasta qué punto 
esos cambios perduran en el tiempo. Partiremos de la hipótesis de Mackie que 
sostiene que los cambios de opinión en un contexto deliberativo no pueden 
ser interpretados considerando variables de forma aislada, sino que deben 
basarse en la red actitudinal de los individuos de la que emergen sus prefe-
rencias. Los resultados nos muestran que algunos cambios no se mantienen 
tiempo después de la deliberación entre algunos individuos. El trabajo detalla 
la importancia que adquieren determinadas variables en el cambio de opinión 
a corto y a largo plazo, así como la interrelación que se da entre diferentes 
actitudes en tres momentos distintos antes y después de la deliberación.
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grounded in arguments precisely because 
they depend on other individual attitudes 
(Gutman and Thompson, 2004; Mendelberg, 
2002). Deliberative theory’s potential comes 
fundamentally from its capacity to adopt in a 
regulated way a political process (non-coer-
cive) that rests on an individual mechanism 
(refl ection) which, in turn, calls for argumen-
tation (deliberation) as the main political pro-
cedure. This is the crux of empirical compa-
rison within normative theory, and also the 
general diffi culty with deliberation: Is argu-
mentation the crucial feature of a discussion 
between free and equal individuals? Are the 
outcomes of deliberation always argued? Do 
individuals in fact change their minds in the 
course of a deliberative process?
The starting point of our study is the idea 
Chambers (2003: 318) launched when she 
proposed that the central element of delibe-
ration was precisely its capacity to change 
and even transform the opinions of those ta-
king part. It is assumed that in a non-coercive 
scenario, participants’ preferences change in 
the light of new information they encounter in 
the deliberation process and after they ex-
change reasons for their opinions. The prefe-
rences reached after deliberation are thus 
supposed to be better informed. It is preci-
sely here that the challenge of deliberative 
theory is to be found (Thompson, 2008: 508), 
when we try to explain in a non-random way 
how those opinions change. A better unders-
tanding of that process of transformation 
may enable a better understanding of how 
deliberation takes place and how it affects 
the communication process among partici-
pants. 
In this regard, Landwehr and Holzinger 
(2010: 379) affi rm that deliberative theory 
lacks a consistent theory about the transfor-
mation of preferences that could explain how 
and why communication affects them. Diffe-
rent compilation studies (Thompson, 2008; 
delli Carpini et al, 2004) confi rm this lack of 
congruence among the various efforts that 
have been undertaken with the aim of explai-
ning changes in opinion. This diagnosis may 
describe the usual process of scientifi c deve-
lopment, with its successes and failures in 
identifying those elements that best explain 
the transformation of preferences. But within 
deliberative theory there is no shortage of 
proposals for understanding and explaining 
the transformation of preferences. The theory 
of the structure of preferences (Dryzeck and 
List, 2003) is a good example of what we are 
saying, but so are attempts to explain the 
transformation of opinion according to Ba-
yes’ theorem (Barabas, 2004), advances in 
psychology (Mackie, 2006) or action theory 
(Landwehr and Holzinger, 2010). 
Among studies of the effects of delibera-
tion the theory of preference structuration 
offers the most consolidated hypothesis and 
it has enabled us to understand that prefe-
rence variability diminishes after a deliberati-
ve process, thus challenging the classic idea 
that individuals’ preferences are manifested 
in cyclical majorities. The studies show how 
deliberation groups the different alternatives 
for the individual under a common heading, 
according to which participants agree to ex-
press their greater or lesser commitment to 
alternatives in descending order (Dryzeck 
and List, 2003). If preferences tend towards a 
similar order in a process of public debate, 
this confi rms normative theory, which states 
that deliberation reduces the overall number 
of relevant dimensions and the number of al-
ternatives considered in each of them. This 
means that deliberation would facilitate a 
shared interpretation of the given situation. 
Nonetheless, the theory of preference struc-
turation still fails to account for the relation 
between preferences and other attitudes in 
order to explain reasonably why and how 
communication affects changes of opinion. 
Consequently, we still do not fully understand 
why preference structuration occurs and 
what factors infl uence it. That relationship is 
fundamental, because if preferences have no 
relation at all with other endogenous attitu-
des, the distinctive meaning of deliberative 
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theory may get lost, since the meaning of a 
choice would cease to lie in the dimension 
with respect to which the different options are 
evaluated (Landwehr, 2005: 46), thus giving 
false closure to the problem of preference 
randomness.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to 
the analysis of opinion change by conside-
ring preferences in their mental context. Our 
starting point is Mackie’s assumption (2006). 
For Mackie, preference is found within an at-
titudinal network and a change of opinion 
cannot be observed as an isolated process, 
but rather on the basis of a relationship 
among different attitudes. From this standpo-
int, a change of preference must be unders-
tood as a change in the attitudinal network of 
which that preference forms part. Mackie has 
proposed that the change of preference can-
not be rationally observed immediately, be-
cause according to his assumption changes 
occur in a long-term process. There would 
always be a rational process of short-term 
resistance and a logical conversion in the 
long term (Mackie, 2006: 299). In an ad hoc 
deliberative context, such as the deliberative 
survey on which this paper is based, this eva-
luation is more relative. The institutional de-
sign of a DS (deliberative survey) predisposes 
participants to listen and attend to the views 
of the others (Barabas, 2004), which is rather 
at odds with what happens in ordinary life 
(Mutz, 2006). So an experience such as the 
deliberative survey provides an opportunity 
to better understand why opinions change by 
considering them as being linked to an attitu-
dinal network. Regarding the hypothesis of 
long-term opinion, we shall empirically con-
fi rm whether the changes occurring in a deli-
berative experiment persist over time once it 
has been concluded.
This article is divided into four sections. 
The fi rst section reviews the points of contact 
between deliberative theory and studies on 
the transformation of preferences by analy-
sing the effects of discursive interaction 
among participants. Next, we describe the 
research carried out and our working hypo-
thesis. After that, we present the methodolo-
gy used to analyse the individuals’ attitudinal 
networks. In the following section we present 
the results obtained from our research and, 
fi nally, we discuss those results within the 
framework of deliberative theory.
DO THE PARTICIPANTS’ OPINIONS 
CHANGE IN DELIBERATION? 
Today it seems there is enough empirical ma-
terial to maintain that the results of analysing 
the effects of deliberation upon changes of 
opinion are ambivalent. Deliberative theory 
has linked this ambivalence to two distinct 
problems. The fi rst stems from the insistence 
of empirical studies on analysing deliberation 
only on the basis of the variation of aggrega-
ted data (delli Carpini et al, 2004: 336). The 
second problem lies in operationalising indi-
viduals’ preferences and attitudes as isolated 
variables (Mackie, 2006; Barabas, 2004). De-
liberative theory has worked on the fi rst pro-
blem extensively for the last ten years, which 
has yielded a discussion of the differences 
between the individuals who participate in 
deliberation (Mutz, 2006) and the internal 
processes that mediate between deliberation 
and its results (delli Carpini et al, 2004; Bara-
bas, 2004; or Wojcieszak et al, 2010). The 
second problem has been tackled on the ba-
sis of the hypothesis that participants’ opi-
nions during deliberation do not change in 
isolation, but in relation to already existing 
attitudes. That is why changes are never 
equal among the individuals who take part in 
deliberation and the process of preference 
transformation is more complex than might 
generally be imagined.
The central problem of deliberative theory 
is to demonstrate that preferences after a de-
liberative process will be more reasoned than 
they were before it. The most important stu-
dies on the transformation of preferences 
come from the fi eld of political science. In a 
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very simplifi ed way, Phillip E. Converse indi-
cated the variability of preferences by de-
monstrating that, along with beliefs, they did 
not seem to be ideologically structured (Feld-
man, 1988). For many years this made it diffi -
cult to explain variations in political preferen-
ces, reinforcing the idea that they were 
random. Zaller and Feldman (1992) gave the 
problem further impetus when they took indi-
viduals’ responses (random) in the surveys to 
be central tendencies within a distribution of 
possible responses. The change of opinion 
would take place when an individual decided 
to accept or reject the arguments she en-
countered (Zaller, 1992). This consolidated 
the debate around the effects of speeches by 
the political elite (framing effects) and their 
persuasive impact on public opinion. The 
transformation of preferences would come 
from variations in the discourse of the politi-
cal elite, the differences with which indivi-
duals attend to those messages and indivi-
duals’ political predispositions, all of which 
would affect the distribution of public opinion 
(Barabas, 2004: 689). 
The infl uence of the discourse of the po-
litical elite on citizens’ opinions cast the for-
mation of preferences as a phenomenon ex-
ternal to the individual dynamic. However, 
subsequent studies clarifi ed this problem and 
opened up the study of frames to the attitu-
des and interactions of citizens. Nelson (et al, 
1997) rejected the hypothesis that the mes-
sage given offered new information that 
could transform an individual attitude in the 
event that the individual was convinced by it. 
For Nelson the framing effect is not reducible 
to the new information, but rather it operates 
by activating information already available to 
individuals and kept in long-term memory. 
Thus the effect of messages is aimed more at 
providing the individual with fresh considera-
tions with which to evaluate the existing al-
ternatives and, in this sense, the message 
activates existing beliefs rather than contri-
buting new information (Nelson et al, 1997: 
235). The effect of a message may be negli-
gible when it fails to bring out the attitudes 
that already exist. In psychology this problem 
has been dealt with as confi rmatory bias, 
which suggests that most individuals do not 
use the new information to re-examine their 
beliefs, but interpret that information from the 
standpoint of their old beliefs (Kosnik, 2008). 
A few years later Druckman and Nelson 
(2003) went further in relativising the effects 
of the political elite’s messages, demonstra-
ting experimentally that conversations among 
participants could diminish the infl uence of 
framing. They concluded (Druckman and Nel-
son, 2003: 742) that interpersonal discussion 
among individuals affects the quality of opi-
nion and competes with the message of the 
political elites.
From the point of view of deliberative 
theory, advances in the study of framing 
effects have a special sequel, in that they 
open up the problem and understand it in 
terms of preference transformation in accor-
dance with participants’ discursive interac-
tion. Preference structuration has provided 
an explanatory model of preference variabili-
ty in a deliberative setting. Nevertheless, it 
does not yet allow us to understand fully why 
and how preferences change. Barabas’s 
work (2004) is an enormous advance in this 
respect. On the basis of the literature of fra-
ming effects, it understands opinion changes 
in line with Bayes’ theorem which, very brie-
fl y, suggests that each individual starts off 
with what he knows, but brings it up to date 
with the information he receives. The results 
of Barabas’s study demonstrated that not all 
individuals start from the same place in a de-
liberative process, which affects the fact of 
opinion change itself. Those who have stron-
ger viewpoints change their minds less. In 
contrast to preference structuration, Barabas 
offers a specifi c model of empirical compari-
son that enables us to explain changes of 
opinion in a deliberative process.
Together with Barabas, Gerry Mackie 
(2006) has set out a new way of understan-
ding the problem of opinion transformation. 
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Based on studies in social and experimental 
psychology, it borrows from action theory 
(Searle, 2004; Moya, 1990) the idea of an at-
titudinal network. According to this way of 
thinking, preference change is a process that 
occurs within an attitudinal structure, from 
which the participant’s fi nal choice (beliefs, 
preferences, information or civic-political at-
titudes) arise. Mackie’s proposal is interesting 
in that it offers a broader explanatory model 
that does not depend solely on the relations-
hip between the information a participant 
possesses (plus new information) and prefe-
rences. 
Mackie (2006) questions the results of 
empirical studies that claim participants in a 
deliberation do not change their minds, since 
attitudes and beliefs are not isolated varia-
bles but related in a network system (Searle, 
2004: 121). As one belief depends on other 
beliefs and other attitudes, the effects of per-
suasion on individual opinions cannot be 
seen directly, but appear as indirect and de-
layed effects given that they must be consis-
tent with a network of attitudes (Mackie, 
2006: 288). Owing to this network, the attitu-
dinal change is not immediate, as the indivi-
dual opposes a rational process of resistance 
in the short term (Mackie, 2006: 299). Mackie, 
drawing upon the tradition of psychological 
studies developed in the study of framing 
effects and adopted subsequently by Bara-
bas, suggests making a distinction between 
strong and weak beliefs, according to whe-
ther they are based on more or less direct 
perceptions. The more a belief rests upon di-
rect perceptions, the stronger it is and the 
harder to change. Tormala and Petty (2002) 
confi rm this assumption when they point out 
that attitudes held with a high degree of cer-
tainty are more resistant to change than tho-
se held with doubts. Accepting the informa-
tion to which one is exposed is negatively 
correlated with prior knowledge of the sub-
ject, and although those who have more 
knowledge show a greater readiness to learn, 
they are also those who put up more resistan-
ce to changing their minds (Druckman and 
Nelson, 2003). 
In this paper we shall take as our starting 
point Mackie’s hypothesis (2006), according 
to which the importance of deliberation does 
not depend so much on changes in particular 
attitudes or beliefs as on the possibility that 
it transforms the attitudinal networks on 
which an individual’s knowledge, attitudes 
and beliefs rest. The deliberative setting ex-
poses participants to new information, views 
different to their own and different alternati-
ves on a given subject. This is why it can in-
fl uence both the acquisition of knowledge 
and a change in beliefs and attitudes. 
Deliberation’s potential consists in changing 
opinions so that they become more open to 
the opinions of others. In this theoretical fra-
mework, where the effect of deliberation lies 
in an attitudinal network, we shall analyse to 
what extent individuals who participate in a 
deliberative survey acquire knowledge and 
change their positions in the light of infl uen-
tial relationships in an individual’s attitudinal 
network, prior to deliberation, at its conclu-
sion and six months afterwards.
THE DELIBERATIVE SURVEY 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL NETWORK
The aim of the deliberative survey conducted 
in 2008/2009 by the IESA (Institute of Advan-
ced Social Studies of Andalusia), in collabo-
ration with the Andalusian Water Agency 
(Agencia Andaluza del Agua), was to analyse 
the debate on the management of water re-
sources taking place among citizens residing 
in the Andalusia region. Given that this region 
is liable to the rainfall irregularities and sea-
sonal distribution typical of the Mediterra-
nean climate, issues concerning availability 
and supply of water resources are recurrent 
subjects of public debate, especially during 
periods of drought. In general, citizens ex-
press opinions and hold particular beliefs and 
attitudes regarding the subject of water that 
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have a direct impact on models of public ad-
ministration, that is, on the different appro-
aches adopted when it comes to regulating 
the use and consumption of water resources. 
While this is not the chief subject of this stu-
dy, it is worth pointing out that before delibe-
ration 26% of the interviewees knew the main 
consumer of water in the region (agriculture), 
whereas after deliberation that percentage 
increased to 88% (table 1). We may assume 
that the implications of these changes are 
worth noting when considering the different 
possibilities of public management of water 
resources.
The deliberative survey on water was ba-
sed on the model of James S. Fishkin (1997). 
The fi rst interview (t1) was carried out in the 
fi rst fortnight of October 2008 with a represen-
tative sample of the Andalusian population 
made up of 1,200 people. After that, a Delibe-
rative Forum (DF) was held in the city of Cór-
doba on 21st, 22nd and 23rd of November. For 
the deliberative forum a sub-sample of 120 
people was selected from among the 1,200 
originally interviewed, in conformity with crite-
ria of representativity by sex, age and level of 
education. The organising body of the delibe-
rative survey sent an information dossier 
about water problems in Andalusia to the in-
terviewees who made up this sub-sample. 
Finally, 113 participants (out of the 120 
selected) attended the forum. There they 
were able to compare their opinions with tho-
se of experts (scientists and representatives 
of interest groups) who had also been invited 
and whose speeches embraced the plurality 
of confl icting positions on the issue of water 
management. The deliberative dynamic was 
based on plenary sessions in which partici-
pants could ask questions or offer refl ections 
to the experts; they also attended meetings 
in small groups of eight to ten people where 
the debate was moderated by a facilitator 
(Cuesta et al, 2008). At the end of the delibe-
rative forum, the participants self-completed 
the same questionnaire (t2) they had answe-
red in their homes one month before (t1).
In line with recent deliberative surveys in 
Finland (Grönlund et al, 2010) and Denmark 
(Andersen and Hansen, 2007), participants in 
the deliberative forum were also interviewed 
some time after it was held, which enables us 
to make a long-term analysis. In the fi rst fort-
night of May 2009, six months after the deli-
berative forum was held, all the participants 
were contacted by telephone so that they 
could answer the questionnaire again. On 
this occasion 100 individuals collaborated 
(t3). The results presented in this paper are 
limited to the answers of the 100 participants 
from whom information was obtained in the 
three phases of the deliberative survey.
The chief aim we set ourselves in analy-
sing the results obtained in t1, t2 and t3 was 
to understand the individuals’ attitudinal net-
work and to what extent deliberation infl uen-
ces that network. At an aggregate level, we 
know deliberation has a different effect on 
individuals (Barabas, 2004; Wojcieszak et. al., 
2010), but our question focuses on unders-
tanding what is going on in their attitudinal 
network. Is it true that the acquisition of 
knowledge infl uences preferences? What is 
the relation between knowledge and beliefs 
or between beliefs and preferences? Is the 
apparent inconsistency of preferences rela-
ted to knowledge and beliefs? 
In order to confi rm whether or not indivi-
duals’ attitudinal networks do in fact change, 
we shall analyse the dependence relations 
among four attitudinal dimensions that usua-
lly play a decisive role in the literature on de-
liberation: knowledge, preferences, beliefs 
and internal political effi cacy. Attitude is a 
complex term that is usually understood in 
psychology as the general evaluation a per-
son makes regarding other people (including 
oneself), things or affairs (Petty et al, 1997). 
Thus, a person’s attitude refers to how fa-
vourably or positively she sees an object that 
is susceptible to judgement. Evaluation may 
vary depending on whether it stems from 
emotions, beliefs or experiences, but it is no-
netheless widely accepted, regardless of in-
Reis 139, julio-septiembre 2012, pp. 225-246
Ernesto Ganuza, Francisco Francés, Regina Lafuente y Fernando Garrido 231
dividual differences, that everyone evaluates 
their surroundings at some time (Petty et al, 
1997).
The attitudinal network hypothesis means 
that knowledge, preferences, beliefs, desires 
and emotions form part of a mental network 
or structure and therefore the aim is to con-
fi rm whether an individual’s attitudinal net-
work changes after deliberation and, if so, 
how. Action theory speaks of mental states 
to describe any phenomenon that occurs 
from a subjective viewpoint. Any mental state 
involves an entire system of mental states 
(Moya, 1990: 62). So we are not attempting 
here to fi nd out whether participants learn 
more or less (Barabas, 2004; Fishkin, 2003), 
but rather in what way attitudes relate to each 
other before, after and a long time after deli-
beration takes place. We chose the four atti-
tudinal dimensions for analysis because, 
fi rstly, it is easy to fi nd discussions of them in 
most empirical studies of the effects of deli-
beration. Secondly, there is a normative as-
sumption. If we were to reduce deliberation 
to a relationship between information and 
preferences, we would precisely be forgetting 
about the infl uence and relationship of prefe-
rences and beliefs, and whether the latter are 
strong or weak, which would mean returning 
to the paradigm of revealed preferences 
(Landwehr, 2005). 
The relation between preferences, 
knowledge and beliefs is not wholly conclu-
sive. Moreover, if the variations that register 
the selected variables are shown at aggrega-
te level, it may be observed that the changes 
fade over time (table 1). Immediately after de-
liberation the changes we are concerned with 
are very marked, but six months later they 
become relativised. There is a common the-
sis in psychology, known as confi rmatory 
bias (Kosnik, 2008), which we have already 
seen in the context of how political science 
has analysed it in the study of the effects of 
political messages (framing effects). Accep-
ting this thesis has crucial consequences for 
deliberation because, ultimately, it would su-
pport the idea that individuals absorb new 
information only in order to re-think existing 
alternatives, but not to modify their beliefs. 
We have seen in the previous section how 
Druckman and Nelson (2003) demonstrated 
that discursive interaction among partici-
pants could accept or reject new information 
and that participants could adopt new stan-
ces on the basis of their communicative ex-
changes. Following Mackie’s hypothesis 
(2006), we shall compare the relation bet-
ween information, beliefs and preferences in 
order to examine whether it is true that in the 
long term, as Mackie says (2006), a change 
occurs in the attitudinal network. In our case, 
we shall confi rm whether beliefs do not vary 
with new information and whether the latter 
modifi es preferences. We shall also fi nd out 
whether changes that occur during delibera-
tion are maintained or transform again.
Finally, we intend to compare the effects 
of deliberation on internal political effi cacy. 
This is a very common attitudinal variable in 
deliberative studies. It may be understood as 
the feeling a participant has about her own 
competence to be involved in politics or as a 
subjective measure of individual evaluation of 
political competence itself (Mattei and Niemi, 
2005). Our interest in addressing the subject 
of internal political effi cacy stems from its po-
sitive infl uence on political participation, this 
being one of the pillars of deliberative theory. 
However, according to the literature, the 
effects of deliberation on internal political 
effi cacy are not very clear. Mutz (2006) thinks 
that exposure to different views, as happens 
in a deliberative environment, may diminish 
the sense of internal effi cacy. In the same 
line, Huckfeldt (et al, 2004) claims that with 
greater exposure to heterogeneous informa-
tion, an ambivalent attitude towards specifi c 
issues increases and therefore the sense of 
political effi cacy diminishes. On the other 
hand, Hansen (2004) found that mini-public 
deliberation increased internal political effi ca-
cy, although other researchers in deliberative 
experiments offer confl icting data (Grönlund 
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et al, 2010: 98). For Morrel (2005) the infl uen-
ce of deliberation on internal effi cacy is very 
scant. Now, what is the relation of internal 
political effi cacy to other attitudes when we 
compare them together? Rather than analyse 
whether or not political effi cacy varies with 
deliberation, our study seeks to confi rm whe-
ther it changes with new information and 
whether it is related to modifi cations of pre-
ferences or beliefs in the event that these 
 occur.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis was based on Structural Equa-
tion Modeling (SEM), possibly the most sui-
table multivariate statistical technique for 
studying and analysing the multiple depen-
dency relations between the variables that 
form part of a social process. One of the main 
advantages in using this technique compared 
to other techniques of multivariate analysis is 
the possibility of analysing multiple relations 
among subgroups of variables. The aim is to 
place the different variables associated with 
the four dimensions we propose to study 
(knowledge, beliefs, preferences and internal 
political effi cacy) on the same analytical pla-
ne. Each of these acts as a subgroup of va-
riables in a structure linked to the partici-
pants’ deliberative process. By studying 
possible variations in the structure, with refe-
rence to the three times when the survey was 
conducted, we should be able to detect the 
changes that deliberation produces, although 
not by observation of the dimensions sepa-
rately, but by integrating in practice the diffe-
rent planes that profi le the attitudinal beha-
viour of those changes.
The goal is to test the structural variations 
arising in the explanatory chains between va-
riables of the initial structure obtained before 
deliberation (t1), by confi rming the variance or 
invariance of that structure at t2 and t3. The 
procedure was simple. We start with the four 
dimensions (knowledge, beliefs, preferences 
and internal political effi cacy) and the varia-
bles that act as their empirical indicators.
These dimensions acquire a sense within 
the problem of water resources, so we shall 
briefl y describe the signifi cance of this issue. 
The two beliefs we use in this study concern 
the environmental and productive value of 
water, which were key aspects of the debates 
that structured the forum and were referred 
to by the experts in their presentations. Mo-
reover, in Spain, especially from 2004, the 
political parties also echoed this debate to 
justify their positions on models of public ma-
nagement of water resources. Thus, if one 
affi rms that ‘unconsumed water is poured 
into the sea, is lost and is not put to any use,’ 
one accepts that all water must be utilised 
before it reaches the sea. This states a posi-
tion we have described as productivist, since 
it overvalues the productive meaning of 
water. Denying that judgement suggests that 
one advocates its contrary, which we have 
called the environmental stance. Likewise, to 
agree with the proposition ‘aquifers are a 
source of water that is under-exploited,’ co-
rresponds to a productivist position, whereas 
to disagree denotes an environmental posi-
tion. 
Preferences regarding the best public po-
licies for managing water resources also re-
veal preferences for productivist or environ-
mental positions. For example, if a participant 
says he is in favour of building more reser-
voirs, more wells or water transfer systems, 
he is advocating an increase in infrastructure 
that will allow a greater amount of water to be 
stored and extracted from the natural course 
of a river or an aquifer. He wishes to increase 
the supply of the resource in order to give it 
to the productive economy and he therefore 
maintains a productivist position. On the 
other hand, if a participant favoured impro-
ving land irrigation or saving water in the 
home, in other words, reducing water con-
sumption (urban or agricultural effi ciency), 
then this would mean he wishes to improve 
the management of water demand and he 
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would therefore espouse an environmental 
position. 
From the arrangement of the variables 
that make up these four dimensions, we have 
devised an explanatory model for t1, based 
on the working hypothesis, in an attempt to 
identify the underlying structure of the data, 
and subsequently adjust the model. Thus, the 
fi rst model sets out the explanatory relations 
that are empirically signifi cant among the va-
riables we bring into play. For models t2 and 
t3 the aim was to confi rm the initial structure’s 
variance or invariance and possible changes 
in the coeffi cient relations among the varia-
bles. We believe that this procedure will re-
veal how the nature of the explanatory bur-
dens in the different models changes due to 
the impact of the deliberative process and 
how the size of the coeffi cients gains weight 
in some cases and diminishes in others. The 
result is the identifi cation and testing of the 
three models. 
Having said that, it should be noted that 
in order to avoid possible bias in the results, 
the models’ specifi city was checked to con-
fi rm the variability of the coeffi cients of the 
different variables at the three times. Conse-
quently, we have discounted possible sample 
singularities that might distort the results in 
the sequence of structures presented in the 
models.
Evaluation of the empirical adjustment 
of the models
The process of evaluating the models is 
usually carried out according to three sour-
ces. In this study we present two of them. 
The fi rst is the evaluation of the global good-
ness-of-fi t indices. The second is the consi-
deration of the signifi cance of coeffi cients of 
relation among the variables that appear in 
the diagrams of the models. These coeffi -
cients, which will become clearer as the na-
rrative thread of the study develops, will help 
us to graphically evaluate the dependence 
relations among the variables that form part 
of the models. It must be remembered that 
the diagrams express only those coeffi cients 
with sufficient empirical significance. We 
have left out the third evaluation source, 
structural equations, as it is not directly rele-
TABLE 2. Attitudinal indicators
Dimension Variables
Knowledge • Correct identifi cation of main water consumer
Beliefs •  (Belief I) Agree/Disagree with the statement “Water that is not consumed is lost and 
poured into the sea”
 •  (Belief II) Agree/Disagree with the statement “Aquifers are insuffi ciently exploited”
Preferences •  Urban saving measures (Agree/Disagree with the proposal “Save water in the home”)
 •  Agricultural saving measures (Agree/Disagree with the proposal “improve irrigation 
systems so they consume less”)
 •  Control measures (Agree/Disagree with the proposals “reduce water for irrigation” 
or “control illegal extraction of water from wells”)
 •  Supply measures (Agree/Disagree with the proposals “build wells to extract more 
water”, “build more reservoirs” or “Transfer water from other regions”
 •  Technological measures (Agree/Disagree with the proposals “exploit sea water” or 
“re-use water”)
Internal political effi cacy •  Agree/Disagree with the statement “It’s hard for someone like me to do anything to 
improve water quality”
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vant to the proposed hypotheses and may 
hinder the presentation of our study.
The fi t indices most often used for valida-
ting models are the Chi-square, degrees of 
freedom, RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation) and p-Value. The Chi-square 
is a measurement of global data model fi t. In 
the three models used the size of the chi-
square and the degrees of freedom present 
relatively balanced sizes, which indicate ade-
quate fi ts. In any case the statistical tests 
based on chi-square are not very sensitive in 
the case of small samples and for our analy-
sis, given that we are working with a limited 
sample (100 cases), we have employed addi-
tional indicators to evaluate the model’s fi t. 
Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989), the crea-
tors of the Lisrel programme, which is the one 
we used for the models, recommend using 
two fi t indices: the Goodness-of-Fit index 
(GFI) and the Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit In-
dex (AGFI). For the evaluation of fi t of struc-
tural models, Rex Kline (1998) also recom-
mends reading the results of three further 
statistical tests: the NFI (Normed Fit Index), 
the NNFI (Non-Normed Fit Index) and the 
SRMR (Standarized Root Mean Square Resi-
dual). In the following table we see the results 
of all these indices for the three models pro-
posed.
As we may observe, the fi t indices have 
values within the margins assumed as ac-
ceptable. The fi t tests show very low RM-
SEA coeffi cients (0.000 in the three models), 
as well as a much higher probability than 
0.05 (p = 0.76 in t1, 0.54 in t2 and 0.84 in t3), 
which indicates that the models we propose 
fi t correctly with the data and are capable of 
capturing the reality being studied.
THE ATTITUDINAL NETWORK 
AND PREFERENCES IN WATER 
MANAGEMENT
The results obtained before participation in 
the deliberative forum show (fi gure 1) how 
participants’ knowledge of the distribution of 
water consumption is signifi cantly related to 
preferences regarding the management of 
this resource. Irrespective of whether citizens 
possess accurate or erroneous information 
on the subject, there is a strong identifi cation 
and coherence between who is believed to 
be the main consumer of water and who 
should be required to make a greater effort to 
consume effi ciently. Most of those who res-
ponded to the survey before deliberation had 
erroneous knowledge about the main consu-
mer of water, which they believed to be the 
home. They supported urban effi ciency mea-
sures. On the other hand, those who knew 
that the agricultural sector was the chief 
water consumer in the region favoured saving 
water in agriculture by improving land irriga-
tion systems.
According to the results of the fi rst survey 
(see table 1), the beliefs of Andalusian people 
concerning water highlight its productive na-
TABLA 3. Coefi cientes de bondad de ajuste
Statistics Variations Recommendable  Values Values Values
  values model t1 model t2 model t3
RMSEA  < 0,05 0,000 0,000 0,000
p- Value 0 – 1 > 0,05 0,76044 0,54153 0,84207
GFI 0 – 1 > 0,90 0,98 0,95 0,97
AGFI 0 – 1 > 0,90 0,94 0,90 0,93
NFI 0 – 1 > 0,80 0,91 0,77 0,90
NNFI 0 – 1 > 0,95 1,00 0,98 1,00
SRMR  Close to 0 0,058 0,061 0,065
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ture. Most participants considered that ‘water 
poured into the sea is wasted’ (belief I) and 
that aquifers are under-exploited (belief II). 
However, there is no consistency between 
both beliefs, that is, they are not mutually re-
lated and also refl ect an attitudinal inconsis-
tency towards the water problem. Those who 
think that ‘water poured into the sea is was-
ted’ and who support measures to increase 
supply hold a coherent position, but those 
who think that aquifers are insuffi ciently ex-
ploited and yet do not support measures to 
increase supply display a certain inconsisten-
cy. One might suppose that if an individual’s 
beliefs place her on the side of the producti-
vists with regard to the water problem, she 
would support models of management aimed 
at increasing, for example, the infrastructure 
that enables a greater amount of water to be 
stored (increasing the supply of the resource). 
This is partly true. In Model 1 there is a posi-
tive relation between belief I and preference 
for measures to increase supply, but we fi nd 
a negative relation between these measures 
and belief II. This result refl ects an attitudinal 
inconsistency, since the same belief about 
the value of water (productive nature), mea-
sured with two different indicators (river water 
and underground water), correlates in a con-
fl icting way with the same management op-
tions. This phenomenon manifests the incon-
sistency of individual attitudes, with 
participants capable of maintaining two 
apparently contradictory things.
Indeed, the attitudinal network of indivi-
duals before deliberation seems to relate the 
type of information they possess (whether 
accurate or not) to preferences for manage-
ment measures, but not to beliefs they hold 
about water, which moreover have no signifi -
cant relation at all with the information. In 
their turn, beliefs have no relation to each 
other and are related inconsistently with ma-
nagement options. Finally, internal political 
effi cacy does not seem to be statistically 
linked to any of the elements included in the 
model. Therefore, we understand this dimen-
sion to have no infl uence before deliberation 
upon the other attitudes analysed.
Like most of the deliberative processes 
analysed in the literature, participants’ attitu-
des and opinions in the deliberative survey 
on water changed once the deliberative fo-
rum was concluded. Model 2 analyses to 
what extent the changes were signifi cant and 
how the different analytical dimensions 
(knowledge, beliefs, preferences and internal 
political self-effi cacy) are related in this new 
phase. If deliberation generates more reaso-
ned opinions then signifi cant relations would 
have to appear among the dimensions, that 
is, the changes of opinion caused by 
knowledge acquisition would have to register 
in individuals’ attitudinal networks, modifying 
some of their components and relations, 
otherwise the changes would be merely su-
perfi cial. 
As we see in Model 2, after deliberation 
preferences have acquired an extraordinary 
independence in the attitudinal network. The 
public management of water focused the de-
bates of the deliberative forum, creating a 
space for different interest groups and ex-
perts to express their management propo-
sals. Each proposal was debated and evalua-
ted by all participants, who eventually 
assessed the advantages and drawbacks of 
all the measures included in the model. At 
aggregate level (Table 1) the participants shi-
fted responsibility for the water saving effort 
from homes to agriculture. While in the fi rst 
survey 29 people considered the effort ought 
to lie with home consumption as against 22 
people who mentioned land irrigation impro-
vement, in the second survey it was the agri-
cultural sector that was required to make the 
greater effort (49 people) and only 6 people 
supported domestic saving. Only the measu-
re relating to agricultural water saving is 
linked to the other dimensions analysed in 
the attitudinal network, although it is not di-
rectly related to knowledge. In fact, in con-
trast to what is observed in Model 1, this time 
knowledge is not directly related to preferen-
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ces; its relation with these is mediated by 
beliefs.
Once participants acquire correct infor-
mation about how water is distributed among 
the productive sectors, knowledge of this 
subject becomes widespread and 88% of the 
interviewees answer the question on this is-
sue correctly. It is logical that if, in the new 
context, knowledge has become widespread, 
this should not help to identify participants’ 
choices about the most suitable measures for 
improving the management of the resource. 
Preferences are now linked to participants’ 
beliefs about water, beliefs that acquire in this 
model a central role in the attitudinal network, 
and which have, in turn, been modifi ed on the 
basis of acquired knowledge. 
Therefore, in this case, knowledge and 
the deliberative process are used to revise 
citizens’ beliefs about water, which in aggre-
gate terms turn towards more environmental 
positions (three out of four participants now 
consider the water fl owing into the sea to 
have some use). Moreover, in Model 2 beliefs 
have a signifi cant and coherent relation with 
each other. This whole change reasonably 
explains the central place of the preference 
for water saving in the agricultural sector. And 
this supports the hypothesis of preference 
structuration and the sidelining of, for exam-
FIGURE 1. Model 1
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ple, preferences for increased supply measu-
res or urban savings with regard to Model 1.
Contrary to what other studies have clai-
med (Morrel, 2005; Grönland et al, 2010), af-
ter deliberation internal political effi cacy is 
included in citizens’ attitudinal networks in a 
signifi cant way. Specifi cally, the indicator that 
measures internal political effi cacy relates 
positively with belief I: those who share a 
more environmental position with respect to 
this belief (they think river water that reaches 
the sea is not wasted), display a higher level 
of internal political effi cacy. The fact that this 
goes in the same direction as participants’ 
aggregated opinion in t2, shows the effect 
preference structuration may have on partici-
pants: it not only serves to share an interpre-
tation of the given situation, but also increa-
ses their internal political effi cacy. It seems 
clear that environmental positions managed 
to infect participants with a sense of political 
effi cacy, by signalling that from such posi-
tions they were able to contribute to solving 
the water problem. The interesting thing 
about the change is that it takes place in re-
lation to beliefs but not to knowledge or pre-
ferences. That may help us to clarify the pro-
blem of confi rmation bias, as in some way we 
can see that the deliberative context helps 
participants to re-examine the beliefs they 
hold, which in turn signifi cantly infl uences 
other attitudinal dimensions. So, what ha-
ppens six months later? After that time lapse 
one might suppose that any deliberative 
effect had faded and, therefore, we could fi nd 
out to what extent deliberation had really in-
fl uenced the participants’ attitudinal network 
in the long term.
Model 3 is constructed on the basis of the 
results obtained six months after the delibe-
rative forum was held. Throughout this period 
the deliberative intensity around the subject 
of water was absent. According to what we 
observe in the chart, the attitudinal network 
depicted in the third model is quite similar to 
that analysed in the fi rst one, when partici-
pants were interviewed for the fi rst time, wi-
thout having taken part in the deliberative 
forum. Just as at that time, not knowing that 
the main water consumer in Andalusia is agri-
culture is associated with favouring urban 
water savings. Likewise, knowledge ceases 
to be associated with beliefs, which was one 
of the main effects participation had upon the 
individuals’ attitudinal network in the forum 
(see Model 2). Moreover, holding productivist 
positions with respect to beliefs is associated 
with supporting measures aimed at increa-
sing the supply of the water resource. While 
these are the chief similarities between Model 
3 and Model 1 (beliefs cease to be related to 
information and preferences are more inten-
sely related to it), which suggest to us that the 
effects of the deliberative forum on the indi-
viduals’ attitudinal network were somewhat 
ephemeral, we also fi nd some evidence of 
deliberation’s footprint in the participants’ at-
titudinal network.
Firstly, the deliberative forum was effecti-
ve in transmitting information on the subject 
of water. Of the 88 people who answered co-
rrectly in the second survey, 21 already knew 
this information; while of the 67 who ‘learned’ 
it during the forum, 33 maintained the 
knowledge six months later, although the 
other half forgot it (34 people). The negative 
relation between knowledge and manage-
ment measures focussing on urban water 
saving indicates that those who keep the 
knowledge acquired during the forum advo-
cate another type of public water manage-
ment measures (in line with the positions 
adopted after deliberation).
Secondly, after the deliberative forum was 
held, internal political effi cacy was maintai-
ned in the participants’ attitudinal network. In 
the third model it does not appear associated 
with beliefs, but rather it is related positively 
with knowledge. In Model 2 the relation bet-
ween internal political effi cacy and knowled-
ge was indirect. Therefore, the new relation 
shows that the acquisition of knowledge is 
not an isolated phenomenon, but rather rela-
ted with other attitudes. This may be due to 
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the fact that in Model 3 knowledge distinguis-
hes once again among participants, at least 
to a greater extent than it did in t2. It should 
be observed that aggregate levels of internal 
political effi cacy (table 1) did not vary much 
throughout the three surveys. However, wi-
thin the attitudinal network, internal political 
effi cacy became signifi cant after deliberation, 
above all for those who preserved what they 
had learned. This tells us that the changes 
that occurred in deliberation have made that 
variable signifi cant in relation to the other at-
titudinal dimensions, which was not the case 
before. 
Thirdly, after the deliberative forum was 
held, citizens’ beliefs about water continued 
to have the internal coherence they acquired 
(see Model 2). Even though the indicators 
used in the survey to measure whether Anda-
lusian people recognise a productive or an 
environmental value in water correlate positi-
vely, their relation with preferences followed 
somewhat different paths. The aggregated 
results about beliefs (table 1) show that the 
population fi nds it easier to recognise the en-
vironmental value of water in rivers than in the 
underground waters of aquifers. In the third 
survey, most participants chose more envi-
ronmental measures based on effi cient con-
sumption (in homes or in agriculture), irres-
pective of whether they thought about 
aquifers or river volume in productive or en-
vironmental terms. As Model 3 shows, belie-
fs now have no signifi cant relation with this 
group of measures. However, support for 
FIGURE 2.  Model 2
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measures based on the building of infrastruc-
ture to increase the water supply largely co-
rrespond to those who think that water 
fl owing into the sea is wasted and has no use 
and, indirectly, that aquifers are not suffi -
ciently exploited. We might think that to some 
extent the turn in participants’ opinions after 
deliberation (towards management preferen-
ces that rationalise consumption) lose their 
consistency with beliefs, contrary to what oc-
curred in Model 2, although those partici-
pants who stray from the majority by cho-
osing measures aimed at increasing the 
water supply continue to be signifi cantly su-
pportive in their beliefs.
CONCLUSIONS
The deliberative forum has an extraordinary 
power to change its participants’ attitudinal 
network. We are not speaking only of a chan-
ge of opinion, but of one that is supported by 
other attitudes. As Barabas shows, the acqui-
red information serves to bring opinions up to 
date, but following Mackie, everything rests, 
in turn, on the transformation of other attitu-
des. Before deliberation, most participants 
who believed that ‘water that reaches the sea 
is wasted’ preferred measures to increase 
supply in water policies that would allow lar-
ger volumes of water to be stored or captu-
red, such as the building of reservoirs or 
FIGURE 3. Modelo 3
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wells. Moreover, the majority incorrectly be-
lieved that most of the water resources went 
to domestic consumption, which markedly 
infl uenced their preferences for managing the 
resource with water saving measures in the 
home. After the debate forum, that connec-
tion was transformed. Information about the 
real distribution of water consumption among 
the different productive sectors affected both 
beliefs: that relating to river volumes and that 
relating to underground water. These in turn 
infl uenced participants in preferring water sa-
ving measures in agriculture. Furthermore, 
those who learned that most water goes to 
land irrigation adopted environmental posi-
tions regarding both beliefs – a co-ordination 
that did not exist before their participation in 
the forum. If that were not enough, contrary 
to the results of other studies (Morrel, 2005), 
we fi nd that internal political effi cacy was sig-
nifi cantly related to this new attitudinal net-
work, whereas before it did not even appear.
Up to this point we can confi rm Barabas’s 
hypothesis and also Mackie’s. Deliberation 
can transform opinions and also change par-
ticipants’ attitudinal network. However, six 
months later, the attitudinal network partly 
regresses to its old ways. This indicates that 
a deliberative context as intense as the one 
that occurs in a deliberative forum produces 
substantive changes in the attitudinal net-
work, but this change is diluted over time. If 
we imagine the deliberative forum as a labo-
ratory, we might say that changes weaken 
outside it.
How can we explain this? The fi rst thing 
we should consider is what Barabas empha-
sised. An ad hoc deliberative scenario is ex-
pressly designed so that participants assume 
an open attitude to the opinions of the others. 
This has been confi rmed by studies compa-
ring a public that attends a deliberative pro-
cess with another public that does not. In 
those studies the fi rst public learns and chan-
ges its attitudes more intensely (Barabas, 
2004; Landwerh and Holtzing, 2010). The 
conclusion that deliberation has signifi cant 
effects on participants’ attitudes is not less 
valid as a result of this. Studying a phenome-
non under controllable conditions is custo-
mary in science. A more pertinent question 
here, raised openly by Thompson (2008), 
would be how to transfer the deliberative 
context to the political dynamics existing to-
day. This question has already stimulated 
studies in deliberative theory on the institutio-
nal conditions that more or less favour the 
deliberative attitude of participants in diffe-
rent contexts (Landwerh and Holtzing, 2010; 
Steiner, J and Bächtiger, M, 2005). The ques-
tion has even boosted the study of delibera-
tion and its conditions in contexts as diverse 
as the social movements (della Porta, 2005) 
or the new instruments of participation 
(Ganuza and Francés, 2012; Talpin, 2011). 
Mackie (2008) even speaks of the deliberative 
effects that electoral dynamics have on par-
ticipants. This is a fi eld in which deliberative 
theory is certain to develop, because a ‘trial’ 
does not wish to remain in the ‘laboratory’, 
although the path that leads from micro-pu-
blics to the macro-public is still an uncertain 
course.
Secondly, we cannot discount the idea 
that while an ad hoc deliberative scenario fa-
vours its participants’ deliberative predispo-
sition, once outside it participants relativise 
their positions on the issues raised. Not all 
participants had the same expectations 
about the deliberative forum to which they 
were invited, just as not everyone drew the 
same conclusions. The data shows us this 
reality in a relevant way. The fact that internal 
political effi cacy became signifi cant after de-
liberation and not before is evidence that 
learning endows participants with a greater 
sense of their capacity to exert infl uence. 
Even though studies on deliberation are not 
very conclusive with regard to its effects on 
the internal political effi cacy of individuals, 
the relations discovered between this varia-
ble and the other attitudes analysed allow us 
to confi rm that internal effi cacy becomes es-
tablished among those who preserve what 
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they have learned. This implies a very inter-
esting contribution from the point of view of 
normative theory.
We might expect that the change of opi-
nion and beliefs will last only if that change 
gives individuals a plausible outlook where 
they may act according to their own positions 
and life networks. This would support the 
thesis that individuals are more willing to re-
cognise their own interest, and to act in con-
sequence, when they associate a political 
debate with the personal costs and benefi ts 
that one or another option might bring to their 
lives (Chong et al, 2001). In our case, the de-
liberative forum afforded participants the 
conditions necessary for re-examining their 
positions on how one ought to manage a pu-
blic resource such as water, which is present 
in their daily lives and for which they shoulder 
a certain economic burden in paying their 
bills. This re-examination takes place espe-
cially when they discover that 80% of water 
resources go to land irrigation, together with 
the fact that in the deliberation all the experts 
maintained that the urban water supply is 
always guaranteed in a region whose citizens 
have periodically been subject to complaints 
by the authorities and urged to manage their 
domestic water consumption effi ciently. Brik-
man and Peterson (2006) have also proposed 
that the infl uence of public debate has a lot 
to do with the ability to link individuals’ poli-
tical predispositions with their attitudes 
towards the problem. In the context of the 
debate on water resources this proposal 
means that internal political effi cacy beco-
mes signifi cant among those participants 
who learn that the main water consumer is 
agriculture and begin to believe in the need 
to preserve the entire water cycle, recogni-
sing the importance of the aquifers and the 
environmental value of river water that rea-
ches the sea. Compared to the participants’ 
points of reference before they attended the 
deliberation, for many of them this whole pro-
cess increased their feeling of infl uence or 
empowerment with regard to their individual 
position on the subject of water. In a way, de-
liberation allowed them to look at the pro-
blem from another angle. In part, they modi-
fi ed their attitudes towards water and now 
feel themselves to be more competent agents 
to infl uence the future of water resources in 
the region.
On the other side of the process we have 
the participants who learned during delibera-
tion, but did not retain their knowledge six 
months later. In comparison with the others 
they have a negligible level of internal political 
effi cacy. From this viewpoint, one might think 
that these participants have not managed to 
link the debate with their own interests and 
have returned to their previous attitudinal 
background. It is relevant that internal politi-
cal effi cacy and preferences for saving water 
are linked before and after with knowledge, 
while participants who advocate productive 
preferences are mainly those who believe 
that ‘the water that reaches the sea is was-
ted’. This happens before and after delibera-
tion, but not while the deliberative forum is 
being held. We might suppose that these par-
ticipants had a more closed or cohesive atti-
tudinal stance before deliberation and that 
six months later it reappeared. Barabas 
(2004) has already demonstrated the impor-
tance of participants’ pre-deliberative situa-
tion when analysing the effects of the delibe-
rative process. Six months later, these 
participants fall back upon their old beliefs. 
Therefore, what the hypothesis about confi r-
matory bias suggests – that the new informa-
tion does not serve to transform beliefs - is 
not so certain: rather the new information is 
disregarded in the long term so as to maintain 
coherence with the old beliefs. But, why did 
they change their opinions during delibera-
tion?
When we examine the data in our study, 
information was the key to this change. It 
must be taken into account that the type of 
information we are considering is simple, but 
at the same time qualitatively changes un-
derstanding of the world of water. Agriculture 
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consumes almost 80% of available resources 
and homes use only 15%. If a participant 
prior to attending the forum believed that 
most water went to domestic consumption, 
her perception of water as a problem would 
be different. The change that occurred after 
deliberation demonstrates this. The new in-
formation had a signifi cant infl uence on par-
ticipants’ beliefs, even on those who held 
productivist beliefs about the use of water 
from the aquifers and rivers. Furthermore, 
preferences took on a more direct relation to 
beliefs than to information. Similarly, internal 
political effi cacy also became signifi cant for 
participants who modifi ed their beliefs about 
water. Deliberation modifi ed the participants’ 
attitudinal network, but did not manage to 
supplant the old one in the long term.
The fact that some of the participants re-
turned to their initial state confi rms the exis-
tence of individual differences among those 
attending a deliberative process. But it is also 
evidence for the limits of cognitive learning, 
or else it shows that attitudinal changes are 
connected with many more factors than tho-
se we are considering. Petty (et al, 2003) su-
ggests that it is an error to think that an atti-
tudinal change necessarily implies the 
complete replacement of some attitudes 
(new) by others (old), given that the latter per-
sist in memory and may influence an 
individual’s behaviour. If it is indeed true that 
old attitudes remain, this would contribute an 
indication of how consistent deliberative 
changes are. For example, the more solid the 
old or initial attitudes, the weaker the effect 
of deliberation in the long term. In our case, 
that may be demonstrated if we observe that 
participants whose preferences stemmed 
from their beliefs (always of a productivist 
kind) return to them six months later, even 
after having changed them during the delibe-
rative forum.
Mackie’s (2006) hypothesis about the in-
fl uence of deliberation in the long term can be 
maintained, although it is untrue that there is 
no short-term change in the attitudinal net-
work, at least if we are considering an intense 
deliberative context such as a deliberative 
survey. Perhaps Mackie’s hypothesis is true 
in the everyday open dialogue he imagines, 
but in a deliberative forum the immediate 
change is considerable, although maybe for 
that very reason it is also more fragile. Let us 
take preferences as an example. Before deli-
beration, preferences at aggregate level were 
coherent with the knowledge shared by most 
participants. Just after the deliberative forum, 
preferences take on a remarkable indepen-
dence with respect to knowledge and are 
infl uenced by the new beliefs. On the other 
hand, six months later, they fall into the same 
pattern as before deliberation. On the one 
hand we have an attitudinal network that re-
establishes itself on its origins and, on the 
other, a change of position by most partici-
pants within that network, which makes the 
result very different, despite being based on 
the same structure. Basically, this is because 
it is a very different thing to believe that far-
mers should save water rather than homes. 
The hypothetical impact this would have on 
water planning and public policy is enor-
mous. Therefore, regardless of whether the 
preferences display instability over time in 
aggregate terms, from the point of view of the 
individuals’ attitudinal network, they exhibit a 
much more coherent and knowledge-related 
behaviour pattern. Thus, for example, if half 
the participants who had learned in t2 preser-
ve that learning six months later, we might 
expect this to generate a different picture wi-
thin the individuals’ usual attitudinal network, 
since they will have different preferences to 
those they had before deliberation within the 
same attitudinal schema. 
Six months later, many participants were 
able to transfer what they had learned to their 
usual attitudinal networks, only now with 
more internal political effi cacy, more knowled-
ge and without the attitudinal inconsistency 
they displayed before deliberation. This result 
fi ts in with the postulates of normative theory, 
since it is not a question of deliberating indi-
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viduals changing completely, but of their be-
coming capable of opening up to the opinion 
of others and accepting decisions irrespecti-
ve of whether or not they agree (Gutman and 
Thompson, 2004) according to their own 
comprehensive views of life. Preference 
structuration around the central issue of 
water saving, whether by homes or by far-
mers, is a good example of this. No one can 
uproot his own connections to life. Therefore, 
an intense deliberation process may have the 
virtue of making the individual refl ect on his 
beliefs and attitudes, although this does not 
mean that in the long term he completely 
changes the view he had, but rather qualifi es 
and changes his present attitudes. To an ex-
tent, the results of this study allow us to say 
that after intense deliberation the attitudinal 
network of individuals is more coherent than 
before. Thus we might imagine that their opi-
nions will be more reasoned, which will also 
enable individuals to have a greater percep-
tion of political effi cacy. 
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